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praetices of the Rabbinie tradition, for whieh "no set of principles"
ean be given "by whieh all eases [of halakhah or Law] are measured
symmetrically or equaIly; instead we find the constant subordination
of the general rule to the particular case" (55). For Levinas, the
skepticism of Talmudic thought pointedly refuses sacralization or
reification by undoing closed dialeetical oppositions and so fostering
"dynamism, ... real rupture" (215). Levinas's turn to Talmudic
thought, Eisenstadt argues, is particularly direeted toward resisting
that Hegelian notion of history, in which events may be on the
move but are so only insofar as they contribute to a universal result,
the edifice of spirit as it is finaIly elaborated by and in history.
Theodicy, in which the suffering of others is justified through its
outcome in history, is, in Levinas's mind, the most unbearable of
thoughts. Eisenstadt's careful reading in her final chapter, "Night
Spaces," of how the suffering of the victims of the Shoah figures
within Levinas's philosophical exploration of the significance of
ethics provides, along with Robert Gibbs's W~ Ethics?, perhaps
the most nuanced and eareful working-out to date of what Rabbinie
diseourse might bring to the writing of philosophy.
James Hatlry
Salisbury University
Leonard Lawlor, Thinking through French Philosophy:
The Being oE the Question (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2003), xvi+212 pages.
In Thinking through French Philosop~.· The Being of theQuestionJ Leonard
Lawlor brings together the philosophies of three of the most
important thinkers of 1960s France, Michel Foucault, Jacques
Derrida, and GiIles Deleuze. The book relates these thinkers to
each other and to their predeeessors in the French and German
contexts (Merleau-Ponty, Hyppolite, Husserl, and Heidegger) in
ways that are not only novel but designed to open up new avenues
oE thinking. The book is composed oE an introduction, eight essays,
and a conclusion, as weIl as two appendiees. Seven of the eight
essays have appeared elsewhere and were revised for the volume,
rhile the introduction, first chapter, and conclusion were written
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especially for the volume. Despite this, the book does not have the
artificial feel of a compilation of independent essays. Rather the
chapters form a cohesive whole. They are organized according to
the relations between the philosophies in question and held together
by several overriding themes.
In particular, the eight essays in Thinking through French
Philosopf?y could be divided into four interconnected pairs: Chapters
1 and 2 present Foucault in relation to Derrida and Merleau-Ponty;
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Derrida in connection with Merleau-Ponty;
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty; and
Chapters 7 and 8 compare Derrida and Deleuze. Although each
essay in the volume could stand on its own in terms of its
scholarship and analysis, the essays are not merely isolated studies
of individual authors. Each is a comparative study that weaves
together the thought of two philosophers, highlighting intersections
and/or divergences between them. In this sense, the studies are
complex and dynamic. The pairing of chapters allows for two
divergent lines of analysis to be brought to bear on each pair of
philosophers, one presenting the oppositions between them and
another their potential rapprochement (e.g., Chapters 3 and 4 present
respectively the differences and continuities between Derrida and
Merleau-Ponty). There are neither categorical pronouncements nor
simple definitions here. The book follows through paths of thinking
opened up by Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Merleau-Ponty and
witnesses their meeting points as weIl as their diffractions. The
presence of Merleau-Ponty in so many of the essays (five of the
eight) serves not only to demonstrate the legacy of his thought
(the book would be interesting for this reason alone), but also
permits a comparison of Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze in view
of their different intersections with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.
A great merit of Thinking through French Philosopf?y is its author's
sensitivity to the nuances of each philosopher's thought. Concepts
are not taken at face value, nor are they grouped together simply
because they resemble each other or share the same name. The
differences that mark off each philosopher from the others are
carefully traced and the commonalities that then appear between
them are more profound and surprising as a result. On the concept
of the "simulacrum," for instance, Lawlor clearly presents both
the affinities but also the differences between Derrida's and
Deleuze's use of this concept (110-11). The "nearly total affinity"
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that he discovers between the two thinkers reveals a deeper rift
(owing to their respective appropriations of Husserl and Bergson)
as weH as a deeper affinity (owing to Heidegger's ontology of the
question) (121).
Another comparison that Lawlor treats in lucid and nuanced
terms concerns the respective critiques of Platonism found in
Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze. The "reversal of Platonism," to
use Deleuze's expression, provides a common frame of reference
by which to situate all three philosophers and is a theme that weaves
together several of the essays in Thinking through French Philosophy.
Hence the significance of the book's second appendix, a translation
by Heath Massey of Deleuze's 1966 article "Reversing Platonism"
(a later revised version of which was included by Deleuze in Logique
du sens). Although all three thinkers could be said to be reacting
against the "metaphysics of the transcendent" (123), which they
name "Platonism," Lawlor's contribution lies in demonstrating that
Platonism has a different sense for each. This is significant since it
explains not only their divergent positions with respect to presence,
for example, but also the different strategies that they adopt for
"overcoming" or "reversing" Platonism. Already in Chapter 1,
Lawlor remarks a divergence between Foucault and Derrida in their
definitions of metaphysics (20-21). While both aim at a temporal
critique of metaphysics (20), a project which they share with Deleuze
(111), this critique takes different forms depending on their
respective understandings of metaphysics and time. Most
importantly, Lawlor shows that Derrida's identification of
metaphysics with "knowledge of presence" and time with non-
presence means that his strategy for overcoming metaphysics will
prioritize "temporal mediation" (20), whereas for Foucault
metaphysics is the "belief in non-presence," and time is identified
with presence, so that "temporal immediacy" is prioritized (21).
This comparison is then seen to have further repercussions for the
respective formalism or informalism of their philosophies (22-
23). With the two essays on Derrida and Deleuze at the end of the
book, Lawlor helps eliminate much confusion surrounding the
relationship between the two philosophers. These essays address
the strange proximity and difficult distance between Derrida and
Deleuze. In particular, Lawlor explains aspects of Deleuze's
philosophy that will have surprised readers of Derrida who have
approached Deleuze's work: Deleuze's appropriation of so many
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metaphysicians from the history of philosophy, his positive use of
the terms "purity," "presence," and "immediacy" (111-12, 132),
and his unconcern for the "death of metaphysics" (98). Indeed,
Deleuze's reversal of Platonism is not simply an overcoming, it
'''conserves' elements of Platonism" (98). Between Deleuze's and
Derrida's reactions to Platonism or metaphysics, different concerns
and methodologies are at play. As Lawlor points out, Derrida's
deconstruction aims to "contaminate" the metaphysics of presence
with non-presence, whereas Deleuze's reversal "purifies" Platonism
with presence (111). This emphasis on purity comes from Bergson
and entails an immediacy that readers of Derrida would find
problematic (112). But for Lawlor the diffraction between Derrida
and Deleuze sterns from two ways of conceiving difference-two
readings of Heidegger's ontological difference (113)-and this is
one of the great insights of his book: ''With contamination, Derrida
is trying to conceive difference with mediation, whereas, with
difference in itself, Deleuze is trying to conceive difference without
mediation" (130). This contrast entails other diffractions between
the two thinkers. It enables us to understand their divergent positions
on resemblance, form, negativity, and on the simulacrum, as
mentioned above (127-33).
Despite their different approaches to metaphysics, a common
project can be ascribed to ail three thinkers: "For Derrida, Deleuze,
and Foucault, the task of liberating thought was the reversal of
Platonism" (140). Liberation from an absolute transcendent term,
whether it takes the form of a telos, of an origin, or of the Other
(142), is the negative side of a positive project that joins together
all three philosophers. This is what Lawlor cails the "renewal of
thinking" (123), a project that owes to Heidegger's re-opening of
the question of being where being itself is a question (153). What
Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze offer are then different philosophical
"options" for articulating the experience of the question, different
avenues of philosophical thinking (153-54). These options share a
deeper affinity, however, for they are all options within immanence
according to Lawlor. Since all three philosophers discussed in the
book are engaged in the reversal of Platonism in one way or another,
their philosophies are philosophies of immanence (143). This
explains the absence of Levinas from Lawlor's book (143 n. 3), as
weil as the evocative reading of Derrida who is presented by Lawlor
as a thinker of "contaminated immanence" (140).
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What is refreshing in Lawlor's reading of 1960s French
philosophy is his ability to recast it beyond the usual slogans of
"the overcoming of humanism" or "the deconstruction of the
subject" (123, 154). Thinking through French Philosophy frames this
philosophy in a new and more productive way. This is made clear
in the interview with Lawlor that forms Appendix I of the book:
"What is at stake," says Lawlor, "is a renewal of thought" (154).
The book does not content itself with pointing out this renewal,
but maps the different tendencies and lines of flight that thought
takes in the movement of renewal. In this sense, Thinking through
French Philosophy does even more than that: it attempts to think with
each philosopher. The book not only traces the logic of the "system
of thought" of each philosopher (3), it also maps the oppositions
between that thought and those of the others and follows a gradual
differentiation which brings it to "that fine point where one kind
of thought turns into its opposite" (3). This methodology means
that each essay traces dynamic lines of thinking that demand of
the reader an effort to think further. It is this method of thinking
with that is, beyond any categorical analysis or static description of
a philosophy, what French philosophy of the 1960s demands of
its readers. Lawlor is right that what is important here is not to take
sides (154), but rather to think through, or with, the multiple
diffractions and convergences that define this era of French
Philosophy.
How then should the project of Thinking through French
Philosophy be characterized? Lawlor calls this project both an "optics"
(3, 143) and the construction of "the system of thought of the
great French philosophy of the Sixties" (3). But whereas an optics
implies diffractions, mirrorings, and convergences, the idea of a
system seems more homogenizing. What Lawlor constructs in the
book appears at the end to be more a network or web of relations
than a system of thought. For one, it is hard to see how three
thinkers can form a single system. There may be a common logic
here, which Lawlor elucidates, but it is unclear whether this can be
described as a system, or whether ascribing such a unity to it would
be desirable. It seems to me that the merit of Lawlor's book lies in
its sympathetic, insightful, and complex readings of each of the
philosophers discussed, its ability to think with each of them in
turn. This, rather than any constructed system, is how the book
itself succeeds in renewing thought about French philosophy.
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In the conclusion, we are told that this book is meant as a
propaedeutic for further studies, specifically a book on Bergsonism
(since published as The Challenge of Bergsonism: PhenomenologyJ OntologyJ
Ethics [London/New York: Continuum, 2003]) and another on the
themes of memory and life (144-45, 161). This helps explain a
shortcoming of Thinking through French PhilosophyJ its fleeting
treatment of the Bergsonian influence on 1960s French philosophy
and the open-ended nature of its discussion of the theme of
memory. The desire to save Bergson for another work means that
his influence sometimes goes unmentioned. For exarnple, the
discussion in Chapter 6, "The End of Ontology," of Deleuze's
critique of the negative mentions only the Husserlian influence
(102). But Deleuze's argument here would seem to owe as much to
Bergson's critique of the negative in L'evolution creatnce as it does to
Husserl's reduction. In addition, memory arises repeatedly in the
book, in several contexts and in relation to all the philosophers
discussed, but the concept of memory, which is at play in 1960s
French Philosophy, is not given the complex treatment that other
themes in the book receive (e.g., language, immanence, formalism,
or time). In a suggestive statement, this memory is defined as "a
memory of the future" (31, 145). In the context of Foucault's
archeology, Lawlor speaks of a forgetfulness that forms a different
kind of memory, a "counter-memory" (45). In the discussion of
Derrida and Merleau-Ponty, writing is linked to a kind oE
memorization that implies the forgetting of the acts that produced
it (67). And in the comparison between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty,
the "past that has never been present" is identified with Bergsonian
pure memory (86, 89). But the connections between these uses of
memory are not developed in the book. One is left hoping for an
additional essay that compares these French philosophers on the
theme of memory.
Thinking through French Philosophy is a well-argued and thought-
provoking work. It can be read as a work on the French philosophers
of the 1960s, but one might also read it for its analyses of Merleau-
Ponty-the chapters on Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze being especially
engaging since they bring together thinkers that are apparently
opposed on many fronts. The book strikes a rare balance: it offers
detailed and complex comparisons of the philosophers in question
without losing sight of common threads, and it brings these
philosophers together within a general framework without
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compromising the depth of its analysis. Thinking through French
Philosophy offers a unique optics for understanding French
philosophy and engages the reader in new adventures in thinking.
Alia AI-Saji
McGill Universiry
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